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FREE SPEECH IN WAR TIME1
"Free Speech" is a very large and formidable title for an afternoon
talk to a gathering of friends such as compose a Convocation audience
in March. But I pray you not to be disturbed. I shall neither try to
cover the entire subject after the fashion of H. G. Wells, striding with
seven-league boots from mountain top to mountain top of controversy,
nor shall I emulate our aspiring candidates for the doctorate of philosophy
by sifting exceedingly fine all of the soil in some tiny garden plot of doctrine. And yet my purpose is not without ambition. I wish to discuss a
narrowly limited and yet important phase of the general subject of free
speech-one that occupies that twilight zone where constitutional law and
public opinion so often seem to strive with each other mightily, amid the
mists of passion and fear and misunderstanding. I wish to discuss it
somewhat as a lawyer must, and yet without technicalities; somewhat as
a statesman should, despite my obvious lack of qualifications; and most of
all as a problem for the practical common sense of those everyday intelligent citizens of the Republic, whose sober second thought forms the
background of public opinion against which our institutions function.
Free speech and a free press, like freedom of the body, of occupation,
of contract, and of religious belief, have long been proclaimed as characteristic of American institutions, and have been specifically protected
in our constitutions, state and federal. The meaning of "liberty" as applied
to occupation, contract, and the use of property has been the subject of
much litigation, and, by a multitude of decisions, certain lines have been
pricked out, which, though perhaps temporarily and provisionally, do
separate with some present certainty and according to a fair consensus of
informed opinion the receding domain of individuality from the expanding
empire of social regulation. Definitions gradually worked out, like these,
in the never-ending conflict of social interests, and constantly obliged to
meet the tests of everyday life, are likely to embody the practical wisdom of their time and adequately to supply its pragmatic needs.
But the meaning of free speech has enjoyed no such gradual elaboration on the loom of time and circumstance. For a brief period at the end of
the eighteenth century, controversy flamed up as the expiring Federalist
party enacted the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798. 2 Its authors were
doomed in any event before the rising tide of the Jeffersonian Democracy,
but these unpopular laws furnished additional provocation to the opposition and inspired new epithets in their vocabulary of political abuse. This
'Convocation address delivered at the University of Chicago, March 15, 1921.
(1798) 1 Stat. 570 and (1798) 1 Stat. 596, expired by their own limitations
before March 4, 1801.
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was probably due far less to any careful analysis and condemnation of
them upon permanent constitutional and political grounds than to the
general temper of the times and to a burning desire decisively to repudiate the Federalists and all their works. If the echoes of their unpopularity have perhaps been mistaken for the clarion notes of a proclamation of unlimited freedom, that is not strange in view of the constant
effort of political theories to identify themselves with constitutional principles. At any rate, for the next 120 years the exigencies of American
life only once produced any real occasion for an interference with free
speech, and, for political reasons, this was chiefly dealt with very irregularly by the executive instead of by Congress and the courts.
The American Civil War was a contest that bitterly divided not only
the North from the South but large sections of public opinion within the
border states and some of the middle western ones. There were thousands
of men in the states not in secession who were opposed to the war, and
who inveighed against it in terms that unquestionably had an effect upon
the morale-of their sections and discouraged recruiting. And yet Congress passed no legislation curbing disloyal utterances in general, though
the statutes against criminal conspiracies to hamper the government were
strengthened.
Those who have criticised the recent Espionage Acts have sometimes
referred to the lack of similar legislation in the Civil War as proof that
such laws were unnecessary and unwise. But there is more than one
way to skin a cat-or, in the more dignified language of political science,
a powerful government in war time can find other means of dealing
with disloyalty than through the courts. During the Civil War it was
deemed politically inexpedient to legislate against disloyal utterances in
general. In the earlier stages of the contest Lincoln earnestly sought to
hold the border slave states in the Union. He was represented as praying: "Oh, Lord, we earnestly hope that Thou wilt favor our cause, but we
must have Kentucky." Men not irreconcilably of Southern sympathies
were to be won over, if possible, by the methods of persuasion. Many
utterances that in Massachusetts would have been treated as clearly indicative of disloyalty, in Kentucky were the 'natural expressions of men
sorely perplexed and reluctant to make a decision that either way was
fraught with such sorrow. Legislation applying to all alike would
have been unjust and alienating to the border state doubters, and would
have been widely criticized as an illustration of the despotism so often
charged again Lincoln by his opponents. But, without the sanction of
legislation, the federal government arrested by the thousand men whom
it knew or suspected to be dangerous or disaffected, and confined them
without charges and without trial in military prisons as long as it saw
fit-and public opinion generally acquiesced in this as a fairly necessary
measure of war-time precaution. The number of such executive arrests
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has been variously estimated up to as high as 38,000. The War Department records, confessedly very incomplete, show over 13,000. 3 Our
recent record of about 2,000 prosecutions under the Espionage Acts, with
perhaps half as many convictions, compares very favorably with this, and
gives no ground for saying that freedom of any sort was more interfered
with in the war with Germany than in the war between the states.
Shortly after the commencement of hostilities between the United
States and Germany, Congress passed a statute forbidding certain kinds
of utterances as prejudicial to the effective conduct of the war. The following year this statute was extended and strengthened, the two together
being known as the Espionage Acts. 4 During the war about 2,000 persons are said to have been arrested for violation of these acts, and perhaps 1,000 were convicted. 5 Several of the convictions were taken to the
United States Supreme Court, and all portions of the law involved in these
cases were upheld, although, as to part, with some dissent. 6
The Espionage Acts and the policy they represent have been bitterly
attacked as a violation of our constitutional guaranties of free speech,
and as an un-American departure from one of our greatest political
traditions. They have been defended in language equally strong and undiscriminating. The needs and passions of war time create an atmosphere
unfavorable to the discussion of such questions with a calmness likely to
lead to judgments of permanent value. Two years after the cessation of
armed conflict we can do better; and so let us then, in the light of common sense and without technicalities, examine this doctrine of free speech,
which, like all doctrines that seek to limit the desires and actions of men,
receives such diverse interpretations.
And first let us consider what are the purposes for which free speech
is conceived to exist and to be worthy of protection against the will of
governments and of hostile majorities. Doubtless it is sometimes imagined
by its ardent advocates as an abstract good in itself, directly beneficial
to individuals as are light and air. To a limited extent this may be true.
That is, the utterer of ideas may obtain a very real satisfaction from the
mere utterance, in relieving his feelings-in "getting it Dut of his system," as it were-irrespective of its effects upon others. If this were
the chief purpose or result of free speech, there would be little controversy
over the subject. Such personal gratifications of the utterer would be
largely a matter of indifference to his neighbors, and it needs no very

'4 Rhodes, History of the United States (1900) 230-32n.
4 (1917) 40 Stat. 219; (1918)

§ 10212c.

40 Stat. 553, U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919)

'Chafee, Freedom of Speech (1920) 387.
"Schenck v. United States (1919) 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247; Frohwerk v.
Unived States (1919) 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249; Debs v. United States (1919)
249 U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct. 252; Abrarns v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40
Sup. Ct. 17; Schaefer v. United States (1920) 251 U. S. 466, 40 Sup. Ct. 259;
Pierce v. United States (1920) 252 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. 205; O'Connell v. United

States (1920) 253 U. S. 142, 40 Sup. Ct. 444.
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mature political philosophy to tolerate opinions and acts that are really
matters of indifference.
But, as an eminent judge has lately phrased it: "Words are not only
the keys of persuasion but the triggers of action." 7 Freedom of
speech is demanded by those who wish to use it to urge others to action,
and often to momentous action; and its restriction is advocated by those
who point out the undesirable character of some of the actions thus
urged. The real controversy is over the desirability of the action that it
is hoped or feared a certain degree of free speech will promote. It is but
to utter pale and anaemic words in a world of robust deeds to say that to
the genuine advocate of free speech the ends of such freedom should be
so far matters of indifference that the urging of any and all of them
should be equally permissible. This has been so well put by Walter Lippmann, himself generally accounted one of the leaders of intelligent radicalism in America, that I quote his words:
"There are, so far as I can discover, no absolutists of liberty; I can
recall no doctrine of liberty, which, under the acid test, does not become
contingent upon some other ideal. The goal is never liberty, but liberty
for something or other. For liberty is a condition under which activity
takes place, and men's interests attach themselves primarily to their activities and what is necessary to fulfil them, not to the abstract requirements
of any activity that might be conceived . ..
"There are at the present time, for instance, no more fervent champions of liberty than the western sympathizers with the Russian Soviet
government. Why is it that they are indignant when Mr. Burleson suppresses a newspaper and complacent when Lenin does? And, vice versa,
why is it that the anti-Bolshevist forces in the world are in favor of restricting constitutional liberty as a preliminary to establishing genuine
liberty in Russia? Clearly the argument about liberty has little actual
relation to the existence of it. It is the purpose of the social conflict, not
the freedom of opinion, that lies close to the heart of the partisans. The
word liberty is a weapon and an advertisement, but certainly not an ideal
which transcends all special aims.
"If there were any man who believed in liberty apart from particular
purposes, that man would be a hermit contemplating all existence with a
hopeful and neutral eye. For him, in the last analysis, there could be
nothing worth resisting, nothing particularly worth attaining, nothing
particularly worth defending, not even the right of hermits to contemplate existence with a cold and neutral eye. He would be loyal simply to
the possibilities of the human spirit, even to those possibilities which most
seriously impair its variety and its health. No such man has yet counted
much in the history of politics. For what every theorist of liberty has
meant is that certain types of behavior and classes of opinion hitherto
regulated should be somewhat differently regulated in the future. What
each seems to say is that opinion and action should be free; that liberty is
the highest and most sacred interest of life. But somewhere each of tfiem
inserts a weasel clause that 'of course' the freedom granted shall not be
Judge Learned Hand in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten (D. C. 1917) 244 Fed.
535, 540.
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employed too destructively. It is this clause which checks exuberance
and reminds us that, in spite of appearances, we are listening to finite
men pleading a special cause." 8
Now, when the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press," what does it mean in terms of practical restraint?
In approaching this problem of interpretation, we may first put out
of consideration certain obvious limitations upon the generality of all
guaranties of free speech. An occasional unthinking malecontent may
urge that the only'meaning not fraught with danger to liberty is the literal
one that no utterance may be forbidden, no matter what its intent or result;
but in fact it is nowhere seriously argued by anyone whose opinion is entitled to respect that direct and intentional incitations to crime may not
be forbidden by the state. If a state may properly forbid murder
or'robbery or treason, it may also punish those who induce or counsel
the commission of such crimes. Any other view makes a mockery of
the state's power to declare and punish offences. And what the state
may do to prevent the incitement of serious crimes which are universally
condemned, it may also do to prevent the incitement of lesser crimes, or
.of those in regard to the bad tendency of which public opinion is divided.
That is,if the state may punish John for burning straw in an alley,
it may also constitutioially punish Frank for inciting John to do it,
though Frank did so by speech or writing. And if, in, 1857, the United
States could punish John for helping a fugitive slave to escape, 9 it could
also punish Frank for inducing John to do this, even though a large
section of public opinion might applaud John and condemn the Fugitive
Slave Law.
It will at once be perceived how great a concession against the
doctrine of any absolute right of free speech are the qualifications just
made. Nor is that all that must be yielded before serious debate can begin. The state may not only forbid the counseling of crimes, great
or small, but it may forbid certain direct interferences with the free will of
men, who, if left alone, might make a choice beneficial to the objects of
the government, though they are not bound to do so. Thus, to illustrate and contrast the two different situations, in regard to both of which
the government may lawfully forbid literal freedom of speech, the Draft
Act made evasion of the draft a crime. 3o Directly to urge or counsel another to evade the draft could then be made a crime, and was so made. 11
But if a man were not within the draft age, it was perfectly lawful for
him not to volunteer, and he was at liberty freely to decide what he should
(Nov. 1919) 124 Atlantic Monthly 616-17.
* (1850) 9 Stat. 462.
(1917) 40 Stat. 80, (1918) 40 Stat. 884, (1918) 40 Stat. 955, U. S. Comp.
Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 2044e.
1 (1918) 40 Stat. 553, U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 10212c.
S
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do, so far as governmental coercion was concerned. But his neighbors were not allowed the same freedom in urging him not to volunteer.
This was forbidden, if intended to obstruct recruiting, on the ground
that the United States had such an interest in the freedom of its citizens
to choose to enlist, if they would, that it could curtail the freedom of
opponents of its policies directly to urge them not to enlist. Similarly,
the United States forbade certain kinds of intentional interferences by
speech with the sale of Liberty bonds, 12 although it was not made a crime
not to subscribe for them. Here again the United States had a sufficiently
vital interest in the freedom of choice of those who might subscribe to
enable it to override the freedom of those who might try by speech to oppose its aims and to induce others not to buy bonds. A similar principle
is well known in the private law of torts, where one man often has a legal
interest in preserving the freedom of choice of a second man from the
inducements of a third.
We seethen, that, without a violation of constitutional free speech,
a government may further its policies either by commanding certain conduct and punishing those who disobey or who incite disobedience; or by
encouraging certain conduct and punishing those who directly seek to
discourage it. So much is admitted by those advocates of free speech who
challenge their opponents at a later stage in the argument.
Now, in practical life, and particularly in a war that enlists cunning as
well as passion, what actually happens when the lawyers have worked
the matter out to this point? A certain number of naive and downright
souls will express themselves with fearless candor; they will urge men
to disobey the draft and not to buy bonds; and they will promptly and
without a hitch in the machinery of justice be convicted and sent to
prison, as an object lesson that disloyal frankness of that character gets
-nowhere except to jail. Then follow their shrewder brethren who fight
-from cover. Instead of urging resistance to the draft, they argue in
-passionate and extravagant language how outrageous and intolerable and
-tyrannical a draft law is, and how unfairly its exemptions are administer,ed; they extol the virtue and firmness -f those who have resisted it, and
compare them favorably with the worlk's great moral heroes; they bit-terly and mendaciously attack the motiv's of their opponents; and they
picture the undeniable risks of battle and disease to the soldier in colors
as lurid and frightful as imagination can conceive them. They say they
are only arguing to influence public opinion to repeal or amend the draft
law, and that, so long as they do not direc tly counsel resistance to it as
it stands, they are protected in whatever they say as political agitation
for its alteration. But in fact what they say, and particularly the man-ner in which they say it, does induce in some or many persons exactly the
same resistance to the draft as if it were more directly urged, and,
u See supra, footnote 11.
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in probably seven or eight cases out of ten, this is exactly what is intended by the utterer.
But the theoretical case the utterer makes for himself compels some
pause to those who do not wish to conduct even a war wholly upon an
emotional basis. A genuine believer in constitutional government can
hardly afford to take the position that in war time men can lawfully be
forbidden to attempt in good faith to secure changes in the laws, unless
such attempts have a modicum of popularity. And the formula he brings
forward to escape the dilemma is theoretically simple and satisfactory:
If the utterer in fact intends his language to induce evasions of the draft,
or to discourage volunteering or subscriptions to !Liberty loans, he
shall be liable to punishment; but if in fact he intends only to influence
public opinion to bring about a change of law or governmental policy,
then he shall go free.
There are legal precedents in abundance for such a distinction as
this. It is a common-place in the criminal law that a man is ordinarily
liable for a certain result only if he intends it, and that if he does intend it and brings it about, or does appropriate acts leading toward it,
he shall be liable no matter how cleverly he conceals his intent, provided
that its existence can be established to a jury. Civil liability in important
fields of the law depends on the same distinction. It is true that intention,
being.a mental state, is often not unmistakably exhibited by words and

acts, and that human judgment will be more fallible here than in ascertaining some other classes of facts. Indeed, a few hundred years ago,
when English law was just emerging from that primitive stage of legal
culture where a man was rigorously held for the consequences of his
acts, regardless of care or intention, one of the greatest judges of his.
time said that the intention of an act was not triable by a court, "for
the Devil himself knoweth not the thought of man." 13 But this idea has
been long abandoned, and there is not now a court in the English-speaking
world that does not daily pass on the intentions of men with reasonably acceptable results. Upon this position, then, our believer in constitutional government plants himself, and passes the Espionage Acts,
which, in the main, forbid utterances intended to produce certain results
injurious to the conduct of the war.
But at this point the argument of his opponent fairly begins.
Grant, he says, the theoretical soundness of your distinction between utterances designed to cause resistance to a law or to discourage acts belleficial toward a policy, and perhaps the same utterances designed only to

secure a change in the law or the policy-how does it really work in practice? Such a law does not administer itself, nor can it be administered by omniscience, nor even by men of unusual acumen and fairness.
Some human beings must decide on fallible evidence the intent of the
" Brian, C. J., in (146f) Y. B. 7 Edw. IV F. 2, P1. 2:
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utterer, and, if the evidence is conflicting, as it usually will be, a jury of
twelve ordinary men decides this. Such men, in war time, particularly
if public opinion favors the war, are almost always impatient of adverse
criticism, and almost certain to regard it as inspired by improper motives
if the evidence lends any support to this. A considerable proportion of
those in opposition will be generally believed to be disloyal or cranks,
and their reputation is readily extended to include others. Such evidence of intention as is available generally consists of other utterances by
the defendant, made at other times and under other circumstances but
admitted as bearing on his general state of mind, and of such inferences
as can reasonably be drawn from the fact that the utterances for which
he is prosecuted are likely to influence some people to disobey the government or not to support it. All of this evidence is likely to be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant, particularly the inference of a bad intent from
the probable results of his utterances. While, logically, it is perfectly
true that you may often properly infer as a fact that a man actually intends the probable results of his utterances, yet, when another and innocent intent may have accompanied them, it is a grave hardship readily
to permit the inference most likely to be drawn when his words are
unpopular. He is all too likely to be condemned chiefly because what
he says is disliked, rather than because he actually intends to induce
unlawful conduct. The distinction between trying to induce men to
change a law rather than to disobey it does not bite deeply into the minds
of a jury who personally think as badly of one effort as of the other, and
particularly when the defendant has used vigorous language. And yet
only by vigorous language can public opinion already fixed be moved.
Moreover, the disadvantages of such a rule do not stop with the probable erroneous conviction of a number of persons who espouse the unpopular side. Others, with perfectly loyal intentions, become afraid to
criticise the acts and policies of the government, even when such criticism would be beneficial to the public, lest they run the risk of punishment or at least prosecution, and so valuable discussion is stifled.
In all candor it must be admitted that our advocate of free speech
scores on all of these points. It is practically certain that a law punishing
speech of harmful tendency, when uttered with a bad intent, will in fact
result in a good many errors and in some abuses. It is also certain that
it will cut off some useful criticism. Is it therefore necessarily unconstitutional or even unwise? To answer this, we must examine the alternative. If speech, in fact likely to incite acts injurious to the conduct of the war, cannot be forbidden unless couched in the language of
direct counsel or advice, it is also perfectly certain that ill-disposed persons, by utterances cleverly designed to keep just within any objective
tests, will actually interfere to a considerable extent with governmental
operations. The entire setting of modern war, with its complex mili-
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tary, economic, social, and political factors, renders this. easy and likely
of accomplishment. The famous speech that Shakespeare puts into the
mouth of Antony, over the dead body of Caesar, contains not a word of
direct incitement to riot. The literal import of its language is all to the
contrary:
"Oh masters! if I were disposed to stir
Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage,
I should do Brutus wrong, and Cassius wrong,
Who you all know are honorable men.
I will not do them wrong; I rather choose
To wrong the dead, to wrong myself, and you,
Than I will wrong such honorable men."
And then, when, after listening to some more of these "indirections,"
his hearers are on tiptoe to burn and slay, he adds:
"Let me not stir you up
To such a sudden flood of mutiny
I am no orator as Brutus is,
But . . . a plain blunt man
That love my friend
I only speak right on;
I tell you that which you yourselves do know;
but were I Brutus
And Brutus, Antony, there were an Antony
Would . . . put a tongue
In every wound of Caesar, that should move
The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny."
If he had been drafting an Espionage Act, would a loyal supporter
of Brutus, albeit a staunch believer in free speech, have thought it safe
and proper to leave Antony at large? You can match the thinly-veiled
spirit and purpose of this speech, if not its eloquence, in many of the
utterances during our war. Of course it would be absurd to say that
most convictions were secured on evidence as clear as this, but, once you
grant that you can punish a speaker not merely for literally direct incitement, but for language likely to incite and so intended, some cases are
sure to be doubtful and perhaps to be decided erroneously.
As so often in human affairs, we have to choose between competing
goods and ills. In war time, speech for everyone cannot be as free as in
time of peace without the certainty of its abuse to the detriment, of our
war policies. Likewise, speech cannot be restricted in time of war to
prevent this danger, save by methods so drastic as to be also readily sus-ceptible of mistakes and abuse. Which is for the time being the more
important social interest-a speedier successful ending of the war, or
a freer public discussion of it? It may be that no finite mind can be cer-tain of the answer, but answered it must be, and by such minds as are
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responsible for what is going on. And we may take such comfort as
we can in the observation that, whenever there has been a genuine fear
of hostile propaganda, speech has been correspondingly 'restricted.
Methods have differed, but the results have been the same. In ordinary
times the social interest in free discussion so plainly outweighs all possible
gains from its suppression that probably only somewhat direct incitements
to illegal or injurious conduct may be forbidden, but, in the emergency
of an important war or grave social disturbance, the pros and cons of
suppressing utterances which, though indirect in form, are reasonably
likely in fact to incite such conduct and are so intended, are at least evenly
enough balanced to sustain a legislative decision either way.
Free speech is not the only or the predominant interest enshrined in
our constitutions. Life, liberty, and property in ordinary times are
also expressly and adequately protected. And just as "due process of
law" in time of war means something different as regards governmental
control over life, liberty, and property from its meaning in time of
peace, so permissible "freedom" of speech in war time is different from
that in peace time. The reasonable necessities of the situation qualify the
war-time application of all our constitutional guaranties save a few that
are obviously intended to be perfectly precise and absolute, and the right
to free speech is no exception.
To the suggestion that advantage might be taken of a war with
Haiti or Liberia to impose the same restrictions on free speech as in the
war with Germany, the obvious answer is that it is not alone a technical
state of war, but a reasonably conceived necessity for the restrictions,
that justifies them. During an important war and for a reasonable period thereafter, while the passions engendered are still hot and the
disturbances of the economic and social order unhealed, the state may
lawfully limit the ordinary freedom of speech and of transactions, if this
can be thought reasonably necessary for the public welfare; but the mere
existence of distant or trifling military operations that have no sensible
effect upon our economic or social fabric would not justify such interferences.
Finally it may be urged that, granting the theoretical correctness of
this argument, it is really inapplicable to a large part of our war-time restrictions, because they were not really needed, but were the product
of an excitement and quasi-panic that deprived men of the power of
judging in calmness both as to the restrictions needed and as to the probable effect of particular words used. 14 But surely the meaning that may
reasonably be placed upon language, and the effects that may reasonably
be feared to result from it depend largely upon the circumstances under
which it is uttered, including the states of mind of its hearers and the
public. One who is repelling assault and battery is not required at his
"See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Schaefer v. Unived
States (1920) 251 U. S. 466, 483, 40 Sup. Ct. 259, 265.
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peril to judge of the proper limits of self-defence with the detachment of
a bystander. In appraising the correctness of his decision the court will
take into account his naturally excited state of mind. He need only decide as well as could fairly be expected from the average man under
such circumstances of provocation and excitement. At least as much
latitude must be allowed in estimating the probable effect of words in
war time. It is doubtless true that, during the late war, men of average
intelligence and credulity believed there was much greater danger from
pro-German and treasonable activities than was in sober truth the case,
but this did not stamp such beliefs as unreasonable, considering the
emergency and the imperfect information available. If public opinion of
average intelligence generally shared the belief that certain types of
utterances were reasonably likely substantially to'interfere with the
effective conduct of the war, it was well within a proper legislative discretion to forbid such utterances, and to take the verdict of a jury upon
this inference of fact and upon the intention of the defendant in making
the utterance. 15 The practical certainty that some mistakes and abuses
would occur in the administration of such a law was to be weighed by
Congress against the equally practical certainty that without it a good deal
of ill-intentioned and actually mischievous propaganda could not be
checked by lawful means and was pretty certain to be dealt with by unlawful violence. To me it seems impossible to say that the judgment Congress
passed upon this question was in its essential features unreasonable, in
view of the existing information and temper of the country, nor that it
was even unwise, in any other sense than that much that is done in every
field, under stress of war, could be bettered in the light of experience.
It is of course not difficult to find some regrettable errors and excesses in both the judicial and the executive administration of the Espionage Acts. The action taken under them, however, was far less arbitrary
and unjust than were the executive arrests of the Civil War, which took
the place of repressive legislation. The ordinary processes of law were
followed, and the usual safeguards afforded to the accused. The acts were
administered in no such highhanded and oppressive manner as was the
Deportation Act. " Many of the sentences were doubtless too severe.
This can be and is being remedied. It has been observed that political
crimes here, being a novelty, have not yet acquired a recognized place
in the hierarchy of offences. Our judges have inclined to place them
somewhere between highway robbery and murder in the second degree.
Countries in which they are more familiar rate them much more leniently.
Perhaps we shall learn this, too.
"See Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) 197 U. S. 11, 34, 35, 25 Sup. Ct. 358;

Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco (1910) 216 U. S. 358, 364, 366, 30 Sup.
Ct. 301.
18(1918) 40 Stat. 1012, U. S. Conp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 42893b; see (1917)
39 Stat. 889, U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 4289/41j.
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After a war comes muck-raking. Some of it, when conducted in the
proper spirit, may afford useful lessons for the future. Most of it serves
only a personal and a partisan end. There has been general disappointment that a new heaven and a new earth have not more speedily followed
the war. Bitterness and disillusion are untrustworthy commentators,
whether upon army, administration or the denial of free speech. Most of
the criticisms of the Espionage Acts which I have read seem utterly
extravagant. To me these Acts seem only an episode, entirely natural and
reasonable, in the gigantic struggle through which we have passed.
They are chiefly significant as showing the adaptability of modem society
to emergency needs, and as exemplifying in constitutional law the important doctrine of the relativity of values. Private property, liberty of person, of contract, of occupation, free speech, even life itself, are not absolute goods to be preserved rigidly under all circumstances alike. Their
value and the protection they receive are always relative to the dominant
social needs. If they are less useful to a society at war than in peace, they
will merit and will receive less protection. But when peace returns the old
values reassert themselves, shorn, it may be not undesirably, of a little of
their traditional prestige. The men of the North believed that liberty was
safe with Lincoln, despite the thousands of arrests made under his authority in the Civil War. They were right. I think we may believe that peacetime freedom of speech is as secure in American public opinion today as
ever, and a recent moving proof of this is the general condemnation that
greeted the expulsion of the Socialist members from the New York Assembly. The Espionage Acts, like the draft, were war measures, tolerated
and approved as such. Neither is in the least likely to become a permanent
policy of peace, and those who are proclaiming the former as a deadly
blow at free speech are ,in my judgment, but engaged in the age-old
occupation of tilting at windmills.
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